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STRENGTHENING SANCTIONS:
SOLUTIONS TO CURTAIL THE EVASION OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
THROUGH THE USE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
Emma K. Macfarlane*

I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2020, Chinese nationals Tian Yinyin and Li Jiadong were
1
charged with laundering over $100 million in cryptocurrency. The source of
2
the funds? A state-sponsored North Korean malicious cyber group. The
process that Tian and Li followed to launder the funds was strikingly simple.
First, Tian and Li received the stolen cryptocurrency from North Korean
3
hackers. They then transferred the digital assets among various cryptocur4
rency addresses, muddying the origins of the funds. This allowed Tian and
Li to transfer the cryptocurrency into Chinese bank accounts and exchange
5
the cryptocurrency for prepaid Apple iTunes gift cards. This simple process
allowed a small group of state-sponsored actors to evade heavy United Na6
tions sanctions levied against North Korea.
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School (2021); B.A., McGill University (2016). My sincere thanks to Samuel Grone for his invaluable edits on this note and support
over the past three years. Thank you also to the editing team of the Michigan Journal of International Law, both for your thoughtful suggestions and friendship. Finally, thank you to Karin
Thrasher for sharing her extensive insights into this topic throughout the editing process.
1.
Spencer S. Hsu & Ellen Nakashima, Two Chinese Nationals Indicted in Cryptocurrency Laundering Scheme Linked to North Korea, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/two-chinese-nationals-indicted-in-cry
ptocurrency-laundering-scheme-linked-to-north-korea/2020/03/02/b6a286c2-5c8d-11ea-90555fa12981bbbf_story.html.
2.
Chinese Remitters Tian Yinyin, Li Jiadong Charged with Laundering US$100m
Cryptocurrency, STANDARD (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news
/section/6/143035/Chinese-remitters-Tian-Yinyin,-Li-Jiadong-charged-with-launderingUS$100m-cryptocurrency; Treasury Sanctions Individuals Laundering Cryptocurrency for
Lazarus Group, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Mar. 2, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov
/news/press-releases/sm924.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.; Aruna Viswanatha, Ian Talley & Dustin Volz, Two Chinese Nationals Indicted
in Alleged North Korean Bitcoin Hack, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/two-chinese-nationals-indicted-in-alleged-north-korean-bitcoin-hack-11583170682.
6.
United Nations member states are prohibited from directly or indirectly supplying,
selling, or transferring to North Korea funds or assets that would be used to support their nuclear weapons program. See S.C. Res. 1718, ¶ 8 (Oct. 14, 2006). The North Korean statesponsored entities which transferred the funds to Tian and Li have in the past been linked to
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The actions of Tian and Li are the tip of the iceberg. A UN report notes
that low levels of governmental oversight in the cryptocurrency sector have
7
enabled North Korea to generate income at an alarming rate. As of July
2019, an estimated $2 billion had been raised through the evasion of finan8
cial sanctions using cryptocurrencies. North Korea is not alone in its tac9
10
tics. Russia and Venezuela have also dabbled in the use of cryptocurrencies to evade international sanctions. The efficacy of financial sanctions is in
this way consistently undermined through illicit transfers of cryptocurren11
cy. As the cryptocurrency sector exceeds forty-two million users world12
wide, it begs the question: If cryptocurrency is left unregulated in the international sphere, will financial sanctions have any power at all?
This note posits that an international regulatory framework is necessary
13
to combat the evasion of financial sanctions. It further argues that the best
way to structure this new framework is through the enactment of a new multilateral treaty. Section II provides an overview of the innerworkings of
cryptocurrencies and the state of cryptocurrency regulation today. Section
III details the inadequacy of the current patchwork regulation of cryptocurrency and focuses on how cryptocurrencies aid in the evasion of financial
sanctions. It concludes that an international regulatory framework is necessary to curtail bad actors’ evasion of sanctions through cryptocurrency. Sec-

hacks of other cryptocurrency exchanges to raise funds in support of North Korea’s nuclear
program. The transfer of funds to Tian and Li were linked to these same reported hacks. In
other words, the United Nations suspected these funds would also be used to generate revenue
for North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. See Hsu & Nakashima, supra note 1.
7.
Rep. of the S.C., at 4/142, U.N. Doc. S/2019/691 (2019).
8.
These proceeds are used for the country’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
Id.
9.
Russian officials conceded that a primary motivation for the creation of a “cryptorouble” (a new type of cryptocurrency) was to “settle accounts with [Russia’s] counterparties all over the world with no regard for sanctions.” CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10825, DIGITAL
CURRENCIES: SANCTIONS EVASION RISKS 2 (Feb. 8, 2018).
10.
Venezuela attempted to make its own cryptocurrency in 2017. President Nicolas
Maduro explicitly defended Venezuela’s efforts as a way to circumvent the financial “blockade” created by the U.S. government. Alexandra Ulmer & Deisy Buitrago, Enter the ‘Petro’:
Venezuela to Launch Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy/enter-the-petro-venezuela-to-launchoil-backed-cryptocurrency-idUSKBN1DX0SQ.
11.
Id.
12.
Lubomir Tassev, The Number of Cryptocurrency Wallets is Growing Exponentially,
BITCOIN.COM (Sept. 26, 2019), https://news.bitcoin.com/the-number-of-cryptocurrencywallets-is-growing-exponentially/.
13.
Financial sanctions are the “withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations
for foreign- and security-policy purposes.” They are typically levied by states and supranational bodies such as the United Nations and European Union; targets of sanctions can range
from entire countries, to organized groups, to individuals. Jonathan Masters, What are Economic Sanctions?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.cfr.org
/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions.
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tion IV proposes a new multilateral framework for the regulation of cryptocurrency. It further details why this is the best option for curtailing the evasion of financial sanctions through the use of cryptocurrencies.

II. UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND
CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION
A. The Rise of Cryptocurrency
14

The use of cryptocurrency has revolutionized international commerce.
15
The first digital currency, Bitcoin, was developed in 2009. As of 2019, an
estimated forty-two million users have access to over 2000 digital curren16
cies. The astronomic rise in the popularity of cryptocurrencies may be ex17
plained by two key properties. First, digital currencies are typically decen18
tralized. Practically, this means that transactions can be completed without
19
the use of intermediaries such as banks. Decentralization is attractive because, as one commentator opines, it removes the intermediaries who “tell
us what to do, tell us what to think, and charge us for the privilege as they
20
gatekeep the juiciest intersections of our economies.”
21
Second, cryptocurrencies are mostly “pseudo-anonymous.” To understand the extent of this anonymity, one must first understand an aspect of
blockchain technology that underlies all cryptocurrencies. This technology
is called “public key cryptography.” Public key cryptography is a crypto-

14.
Ilker Koksal, The Rise of Crypto as Payment Currency, FORBES (Aug. 23,
2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilkerkoksal/2019/08/23/the-rise-of-crypto-aspayment-currency/#42d0901b26e9.
15.
Chris McCann, 12 Graphs That Show Just How Early the Cryptocurrency Market
Is, MEDIUM (May 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@mccannatron/12-graphs-that-show-justhow-early-the-cryptocurrency-market-is-653a4b8b2720.
16.
Reiff, supra note 13.
17.
Note here the distinction between digital currencies and cryptocurrencies. Digital
currencies are the “overall superset” that includes cryptocurrencies. Some digital currencies—
such as Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDCs”)—have the potential for mass centralization. Because cryptocurrencies rely on cryptography (unlike, for example CBDCs), this leads
to greater inherent decentralization. For more on this, see Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Marla
Soledad Martinez Peira, Itai Agur, Anil Ari, John Kiff, Adina Popescu & Celine Rochon, Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currencies, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Nov. 12, 2018).
18.
Id. New cryptocurrencies that have a centralized framework (such as Libra) are not
included within this analysis.
19.
Id.; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 6 (Mar.
2018).
20.
Clem Chambers, Decentralized Cryptocurrencies are the Future, FORBES (Sept. 6,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2018/09/06/decentralized-cryptocurrencies-arethe-future/#731549f235b1.
21.
Dong He, Karl Habermeier, Ross Leckow, Vikram Haksar, Yasmin Almeida, Mikari
Kashima, Nadim Kyriakos-Saad, Hiroko Oura, Tashin Saadi Sedik, Natalia Stetsenko & Concepcion Verdugo-Yepes, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations 9 (Jan. 2016).
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22

graphic system that uses a pair of digital keys. Each cryptocurrency user
23
24
has two keys. One is a public key, and one is private. The private key is a
25
randomly generated hexadecimal number. As the name suggests, the user
26
must keep their private key private at all times. Public keys are another
hexadecimal number; they are derived from (and have a mathematical rela27
28
tionship to) the private key. A user need not keep their public key private.
A simple illustration helps demonstrate how public and private keys fa29
cilitate anonymity in cryptocurrency transactions. Imagine that Sally wants
to sell Jake her lawnmower. Jake will pay Sally using Bitcoins encrypted by
public key cryptography. Because Sally and Jake are both Bitcoin users,
they each have one public key and one private key. Jake sends Bitcoins to
Sally. It is best to think of these Bitcoins as being transferred within a small
(digital) box. Jake “locks” (encrypts) the box using Sally’s public key. When
Sally receives the box, she “unlocks” (decrypts) it using her own private
key. This works because Sally’s public and private keys are mathematically
related.
One component of this illustration is crucial to understand the nature of
cryptocurrency: the identities of Sally and Jake are themselves obscured to
third-parties. The only identifiable information within the transaction to other users—Sally’s public key—is itself mathematically scrambled into a
30
number referred to as a “hash.” In this way, users in cryptocurrency trans31
actions may retain a high level of anonymity. The transaction that other users can see, then, is informationally equivalent to: User A is sending fifteen
coins to User X.

22.
Id. at 10, fn. 8.
23.
See id.
24.
See id.
25.
See DELOITTE, A MARKET OVERVIEW OF CUSTODY FOR DIGITAL ASSETS 6 (June
2020).
26.
Public and Private Keys, BLOCKCHAIN.COM (Mar. 29, 2020), https://support.
blockchain.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000951966-Public-and-private-keys.
27.
What is Public-Key Cryptography?, GLOB. SIGN (2020), https://www.global
sign.com/en/ssl-information-center/what-is-public-key-cryptography.
28.
Id.
29.
For an in-depth and accessible explanation of the workings of public key cryptography, see Surveillance Defense, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/deep-dive-end-end-encryption-how-do-public-key-encryptionsystems-work.
30.
Ed Felten, Does Hashing Make Data “Anonymous”?, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (April
22, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2012/04/does-hashing-make-dataanonymous.
31.
Id.
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B. The Regulation of Cryptocurrency
The proliferation of cryptocurrency has raised the need for cross-border
32
regulation. The overall cryptocurrency market size is projected to reach
33
$1.4 billion USD by 2024; this is complemented by the increasing willing34
ness of certain countries to move toward cashless economies. Moreover,
not only has the number of cryptocurrency users grown, but also the nature
of cryptocurrency transactions has evolved. Cryptocurrencies are not only
35
used for private monetary exchanges, but for investments in start-ups, trav36
eling into space, and for buying goods such as Lamborghinis on the luxury
37
marketplace.
Cryptocurrencies are also used for illicit activities. The transactional
anonymity that comes alongside the use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin at38
tracts users who engage in a host of illegal behaviors. Bitcoin is frequently

32.
Ralph Auer & Stijn Claessens, Regulating Cryptocurrencies: Assessing Market Reactions, BIS QUARTERLY REV. (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_
qt1809f.htm; Ana Alexandre, New Study Reveals Countries with Most Registered Crypto Exchanges, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 11, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-studyreveals-countries-with-most-registered-crypto-exchanges (“In 2018, the total volume of
bitcoin directly transferred between exchanges was almost $92.6 billion. A total of $65.1 billion was transferred by exchanges from G20 countries, Hong Kong, and Singapore.”).
33.
Cryptocurrency Market by Offering, MARKETS & MARKETS (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/cryptocurrency-market158061641.html.
34.
Elena Perez, Crypto vs. Cash: Which Countries Expect to Go Digital Soon?,
COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-vs-cash-whichcountries-expect-to-go-digital-soon (noting, for example, that Sweden uses cash for only 2%
of payment transactions and that by 2030 “it is expected that only 10% of the money spent in
Canada will be completed with cash transactions.”); see also Ryan Browne, People in Sweden
Barely Use Cash – and That’s Sounding Alarm Bells for the Country’s Central Bank, CNBC
(May 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/sweden-cashless-future-sounds-alarmbells-for-the-central-bank.html.
35.
See Justin O’Connell, Venture Capital’s View of DeFi, FORBES (March 5, 2020).
36.
Roger Huang, Cryptocurrency Is Strengthened By Space Exploration, FORBES
(June 29, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerhuang/2020/06/29/cryptocurrency-isstrengthened-by-space-exploration/#5ac493143c5b.
37.
Ali Montag, This Cryptomillionaire Bought a Lamborghini for $115 Thanks to
Bitcoin, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/bitcoin-millionaires-arebuying-lamborghinis-with-cryptocurrency.html.
38.
As of 2018, close to one-half of bitcoin transactions were associated with illegal
activity. Further, “the estimated 24 million bitcoin market participants that use bitcoin primarily for illegal purposes (as at April 2017) annually conduct around 36 million transactions, with
a value of around $72 billion, and collectively hold around $8 billion worth of bitcoin.” Sean
Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & T lis J. Putninš, Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, UNIV. OF OXFORD BUS. L. (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/02/sex-drugs-and-bitcoin-how-muchillegal-activity-financed-through; Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo,
Donato Masciandaro & Giovanno Rabitti, Cryptocurrencies, Central Bank Digital Cash, Tra-
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identified as a method for financing terrorism, money laundering, illicit
41
42
weapons procurement, and large-scale drug deals, among other illegiti43
mate uses.
Cryptocurrencies today are regulated sporadically on a nation-by-nation
44
basis. It is striking that despite the ubiquity of cryptocurrency the world
45
over, no international uniform regulatory system exists. Cryptocurrency is
anomalous in this respect. In our globalized society, international organizations have gone to great lengths to regulate activities with high cross-border
46
47
implications. The flight of aircrafts, the transfer of goods, various finan48
49
cial services, and environmental emissions are all regulated through the
ditional Money: Does Privacy Matter?, 7 (Ctr. Applied Rsch. on Int’l Mkts, Banking, Fin. &
Reg., Working Paper N. 95, 2018)
39.
Cynthia Dion-Schwarz, David Manheim & Patrick B. Johnston, Terrorist Use of
Cryptocurrencies, RAND CORP. ix (2019), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3026/RAND_RR3026.pdf.
40.
See, e.g., Mike Orcutt, Criminals Laundered $2.8 Billion in 2019 Using Crypto Exchanges, Finds a New Analysis, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.technology
review.com/f/615064/cryptocurrency-money-laundering-exchanges/.
41.
See, e.g., Foley et. al., supra note 38.
42.
Id.
43.
Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC.
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins
/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html; Adam Barone, The Future of Cryptocurrency in 2019 and Beyond, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/091013
/future-cryptocurrency.asp. Although Bitcoin is often the target of public ire for illegal behaviors—likely due at least in part to its public visibility and popularity—other cryptocurrencies
such as Ethereum, Ripple, and Litecoin have the same potential for the illegitimate uses mentioned here. See, e.g., Joseph Young, Why a Mysterious Ethereum User Paid $2.6 Million to
Send $130 of Crypto, FORBES (June 10, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/youngjoseph
/2020/06/10/why-a-mysterious-crypto-user-paid-26-million-to-send-merely-130-in-ethereum
/#79c73993588a; Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Roughly $400 Million of Ripple Tokens Tied to
Illegal Activity: Elliptic, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news
/technology/articles/2019-11-20/roughly-400-million-of-ripple-tokens-tied-to-illegal-activityelliptic; Rakesh Sharma, Litecoin Gains Ground on Bitcoin in the Dark Web, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/news/litecoin-gains-ground-bitcoin-dark-web/.
44.
See Global Legal Research Center, Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World,
L. LIBR. CONG. 8–9 (June 2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/crypto
currency-world-survey.pdf.
45.
See Helen Partz, 19% of World Population Bought Crypto Before 2019: Kaspersky
Report, COINTELEGRAPH (June 21,2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/19-of-worldpopulation-bought-crypto-before-2019-kaspersky-report.
46.
See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7 1944, 15 U.N.T.S 295.
47.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
I.L.M 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
48.
See, e.g., James Chen, Basel Accord, INVESTOPEDIA (July 22, 2019)
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/basel_accord.asp.
49.
See Hans W. Micklitz, International Regulation on Health, Safety and the Environment - Trends and Challenges, J. OF CONSUMER POL. 23 (Mar. 2000).
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force of international agreements. Commentators believe that the regulation
50
of cryptocurrency is within reach. However, there is scant agreement on a
framework or method of implementation that would function as an effective
51
international regulatory solution.

III. THE PROBLEMATIC ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES
State-by-state regulation of cryptocurrencies has problematic implications for cross-border investigations and predictability in application. Moreover, this regulatory framework leaves open opportunities for actors worldwide to violate international sanctions with impunity. Section III.A details
the upswing in enforcement efforts as well as the lack of a formal, uniform
mechanism to regulate cryptocurrency. It also explores the unwelcome consequences that come hand-in-hand with a dearth of international regulation.
Section III.B details how cryptocurrencies are used to evade international
sanctions and explains why the lack of overarching regulation is especially
problematic in the sanctions context. Finally, Section III.C identifies both
the conceptual and ethical problems associated with a scarcity of international cryptocurrency regulation.

A. Repercussions of Declining to Regulate Cryptocurrency on an
International Level
Cryptocurrencies cannot be effectively regulated by a patchwork of
laws which vary from nation to nation. Two problems arise without an international regulatory framework. First, the interaction of national laws results
in a framework that is both over- and under-inclusive for investigations and
prosecutions. Second, enforcement mechanisms are unpredictable. This
scares away institutional investment in cryptocurrency and inhibits the development of cryptocurrency in areas that matter most, such as emerging
economies.

50.
Kate Rooney, Your Guide to Cryptocurrency Regulations Around the World and
Where They Are Headed, CNBC: MARKETS (March 27, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/27/a-complete-guide-to-cyprocurrency-regulations-aroundthe-world.html.
51.
Compare Ed Howden, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain
Future, EMORY INT’L L. REV. 742 (2015) (arguing that regulatory bodies must undertake the
regulation of all cryptocurrencies), with Hossein Nabilou, How to Regulate Bitcoin? Decentralized Regulation for a Decentralized Cryptocurrency, INT’L J. OF L. & INFO. TECH. 266
(2019) (arguing that cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin cannot be regulated in a centralized fashion because of their decentralized structure, and that regulation must occur at their code or
protocol layer).
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1. Over- and Under-Inclusivity
A nation-by-nation legal framework has the two-pronged weakness of
being both over- and under-inclusive. The framework is underinclusive because it allows those using cryptocurrency for illicit purposes to slip through
the cracks and remain untouched by any country’s law. Consider, for instance, those users who intend to exploit cryptocurrency for the purpose of
52
tax evasion. In August 2019, the Portugal Tax Authority announced that
neither cryptocurrency trading nor payments made through the use of cryp53
tocurrency would be taxed within the country. Conversely, Sweden applies
a capital gains tax of thirty percent to all forms of cryptocurrency, taking the
54
view that digital coins are assets rather than cash. These radically differing
policies combined with the “default privacy features” that define digital as55
sets have effectively made cryptocurrency “the new Swiss bank account”:
Without an overarching regulatory authority, there is little to prevent a Swedish coin holder from storing, trading, and profiting from cryptocurrency
56
held in Portugal, all without paying the taxes mandated by Swedish law. A
mechanism is needed to identify those actors that seek to evade their countries’ taxes. Without international coordination, this remains near impossi57
ble.
Legal inconsistencies from nation to nation also results in the potential
for over-inclusive regulation. The paucity of supranational regulation invites
a high likelihood of overlapping liability. This risks the violation of the

52.
See António Madeira, No Tax for You: Why Crypto Traders and Miners Might Head
to Portugal, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 28, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/no-tax-for-youwhy-crypto-traders-and-miners-might-head-to-portugal.
53.
Kelly Phillips Erb, Portugal Tax Authorities Clarify That Buying or Selling Cryptocurrency is Tax-Free, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb
/2019/09/19/portugal-tax-authorities-clarify-that-buying-or-selling-cryptocurrency-is-tax-free
/#3fa72b9277e3.
54.
Blockpit.io, How are Cryptocurrencies Regulated in Sweden?, MEDIUM
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://medium.com/the-capital/how-are-cryptocurrencies-regulated-insweden-8beffcce80fa.
55.
Kieran Smith, How Crypto Could Bring Tax Evasion to the Masses, ONEZERO (July
18, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/how-crypto-could-bring-tax-evasion-to-the-massesbb4060766147.
56.
As a counterpoint to this which demonstrates the importance of an overarching regulatory body, consider countries typically classified as “tax havens.” Although there is not a
comprehensively defined standard for the classification of a tax haven country, there are several regulatory bodies that monitor those countries that may qualify as tax havens. These organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), act
as intergovernmental mediators so as to stimulate economic progress and world trade. See
Julia Kagan, Tax Haven, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/t/taxhaven.asp. See also Who We Are, OECD (2020), https://www.oecd.org/about/.
57.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., art. 1, Aug. 6, 1982, 35 U.S.T. 1999.
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58

common law concept of double jeopardy and its civil law counterpart ne
59
bis in idem (“not twice in the same thing”). Let us use Hamas, a militant
Palestinian group, and their cryptocurrency fundraising campaigns as an il60
lustration. Hamas is regarded as a terrorist organization by the European
61
Court of Justice. Transfers of funds to Hamas are prohibited by countries
62
within the European Union and the United States. Hypothesize a case in
which a Spanish citizen transfers digital coins to an agent of Hamas located
in Texas. Both the United States and Spain wish to prosecute; each country
has jurisdiction over the perpetrator in question; both states have different
63
laws which apply to “the same common nucleus of operative facts.” Without the aid of international regulations to guide questions of jurisdiction regarding illicit cryptocurrency transfers, a high risk of “carbon copy prosecu64
tions” emerges.
Carbon copy prosecutions refer to duplicative prosecutions brought in
65
different foreign jurisdictions for the same conduct. Countries have a sub66
stantial incentive to vindicate their own laws at the best of times. With respect to Bitcoin transactions, of which an estimated forty-six percent in-

58.
Double Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining double
jeopardy as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same offense.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. (stating that “[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
59.
Robin Geiss, Ne Bis In Idem, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. (July 2013) (defining ne bis in
idem as “. . . the principle that nobody should be judged twice for the same offence.”).
60.
Nathaniel Popper, Terrorists Turn to Bitcoin for Funding, and They’re Learning
Fast, NY TIMES (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/18/technology/terroristsbitcoin.html; Jason Brett, Israel Counter-Terrorism Institute Reports Hamas Using Bitcoin as
A Funding Source, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett
/2020/01/21/israeli-counter-terrorism-institute-reports-hamas-using-bitcoin-as-a-fundingsource/#4bc5a73d4994.
61.
Lizzie Dearden, Hamas Declared a Terrorist Organisation by the European Court
of Justice, INDEPENDENT (July 26, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
/europe/hamas-terrorist-organisation-ecj-european-court-of-justice-eu-uk-palestinian-israela7860301.html.
62.
Id.; Max Greenwood, US Adds Hamas Leader to Terror Blacklist, Imposes Sanctions, HILL (Jan. 31, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/international/371657-us-adds-hamasleader-to-terror-blacklist-imposes-sanctions.
63.
This is a fixture of redundant or “carbon copy” prosecutions. Andrew S. Boutros &
T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing Anticorruption Phenomenon in a
Shrinking World, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 269 (2012) [hereinafter “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions].
64.
Id.
65.
See Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, The Evolution and Status of ‘Carbon
Copy Prosecutions’: An Anticorruption Phenomenon Here to Stay, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 12,
2018),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/the-evolution-andstatus-of-carbon-copy-prosecutions-an-anticorruption-phenomenon-here-to-stay.
66.
Id.
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67

volve illicit goods, this interest is particularly salient. Carbon copy prosecutions typically apply to enforcement actions brought under the Foreign
68
Corrupt Practices Act, but there is reason to believe that they may be used
more broadly within the context of cryptocurrency. Just as a number of na69
tions have passed “enhanced” anti-corruption laws, so too is the trend with
70
respect to national laws regulating the use of digital currencies. Over the
past four years, an upswing in legal regulations of digital currencies has
been accompanied by an increase in laws providing for enhanced extraterri71
torial application. This closely mimics the legal landscape which allowed
72
for redundant prosecutions of foreign bribery to proliferate.

2. Unpredictability
There exists a second unwelcome consequence of nation-by-nation regulation. Without a homogeneous approach to the regulation of cryptocurren73
cy, laws and enforcement mechanisms are unpredictable. The implications
of this are twofold.
First, regulatory uncertainty is keeping institutional investors out of the
74
cryptocurrency marketplace. Without consistent, clear guidance on how
cryptocurrencies are treated in cross-border transactions, institutional inves75
tors will likely remain sidelined from the market. Cryptocurrencies need
67.
Foley et. al., supra note 38, at 1798 (“. . . around $76 billion of illegal activity per
year involves bitcoin (46% of bitcoin transactions), which is close to the scale of the U.S. and
European markets for illegal drugs.”).
68.
See generally Richard L. Cassin, ‘Carbon Copy Prosecutions’ Change the Rules of
the Game, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012), https://fcpablog.com/2012/11/09/carbon-copyprosecutions-change-the-rules-of-the-game/.
69.
“Carbon Copy” Prosecutions, supra note 63, at 270.
70.
See Global Legal Research Center, supra note 44, at 1 (“This report covers 130
countries as well as some regional organizations that have issued laws or policies on the subject. The past four years have seen cryptocurrencies become ubiquitous, prompting more national and regional authorities to grapple with their regulation.”).
71.
See id. at 1–2.
72.
“Carbon Copy” Prosecutions, supra note 63, at 271.
73.
See generally Douglas J. Cumming, Sofia Johan & Anshum Pant, Regulation of the
Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty, J. RISK & FIN.
MGMT (July 2019).
74.
See id.; Danny Nelson, More than Half of Financial Advisors Want Better Regulation Before Investing in Crypto, COINDESK (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/morethan-half-of-financial-advisors-want-better-regulation-before-investing-in-crypto; see also
Rachel Wolfson, Self-Regulatory Advancements to Crypto Market Will Spark Interest From
Institutional Investors, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson
/2018/08/13/self-regulatory-advancements-to-crypto-market-will-spark-interest-frominstitutional-investors/.
75.
See Stephen J. Obie & Mark W. Rasmussen, How Regulation Could Help Cryptocurrencies Grow, HARVARD BUS. REV. (July 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/how-regulationcould-help-cryptocurrencies-grow; see also Michael Liftik, Dave Grable & Heather Christenson, The Pitfalls of SEC’s Crypto Regulation by Enforcement, LAW360 (Jan. 10, 2020),
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institutional investors because a market that rests solely on retail investors is
76
subject to extreme volatility. International regulations that promote the
predictability of enforcement mechanisms would have the effect of stabilizing the cryptocurrency market by appeasing institutional investors’ fear of
77
“regulation by enforcement.”
Second, the reticence of institutional investors to invest in cryptocurrency has an outsized effect on emerging economies. Cryptocurrency is an efficient method to bring financial inclusion and financial sector development
78
to developing countries. The lack of brick-and-mortar banks in large
swaths of sub-Saharan Africa is a problem that experts believe might be re79
solved with the advent of mobile money services such as cryptocurrency.
Further, citizens in countries with corrupt or unstable governments may find
80
relief through investment in digital assets. Populations in developing countries who miss out on these unrealized benefits are those who need them the
most. The international regulation of cryptocurrency would act as a step toward encouraging institutional investment in digital coin technology without
the underlying fear of violating a patchwork of incompatible national laws.

https://www.law360.com/articles/1231846/the-pitfalls-of-sec-s-crypto-regulation-byenforcement.
76.
See Liam Kelly, Regulatory Uncertainty Keeps Institutional Money Sidelined,
CRYPTO BRIEFING (Dec. 5, 2019), https://cryptobriefing.com/regulatory-uncertaintyinstitutional-money/.
77.
Liftik, Grable & Christenson, supra note 75.
78.
Financial inclusion means that, “individuals and businesses have access to useful
and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – transactions, payments,
savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustainable way.” Financial Inclusion Overview, WORLD BANK (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic
/financialinclusion/overview. See also Olusegun Vincent & Olaniyi Evans, Can Cryptocurrency, Mobile Phones, and Internet Herald Sustainable Financial Sector Development in Emerging Markets?, J. OF TRANSNAT’L MGMT. 259, 270 (2019). Note that internet access is a necessary component of cryptocurrency and this poses more of a difficulty in developing than
developed countries. But as mobile connectivity becomes increasingly widespread within
emerging economies, this problem will slowly dissipate.
79.
Jean-Phillippe Stijns, Banking in Sub-Saharn Africa: Interim Report on Digital Financial Inclusion, EUR. INV. BANK 1 (2017) https://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/economic_
report_banking_africa_interim_2017_en.pdf. Note that other financial instruments such as
MPESA have also made great strides in improving financial access and inclusion in developing countries. See Kieron Monks, M-Pesa: Kenya’s Mobile Money Success Story Turns 10,
th
CNN
(Feb.
24,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/21/209frica/mpesa-10 anniversary/index.html.
80.
See Pavithra Rao, Africa Could Be the Next Frontier for Cryptocurrency, U.N.:
AFR. RENEWAL (Apr. 2018), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2018-july-2018
/africa-could-be-next-frontier-cryptocurrency.
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B. Cryptocurrencies and the Evasion of International
Financial Sanctions
The evasion of international financial sanctions through the use of cryptocurrency is a well-documented phenomenon and perhaps one of the most
81
problematic practices facilitated by cryptocurrencies. There are a number
of actors who take advantage of cryptocurrency to evade international finan82
cial sanctions. Chief among these are countries themselves. Iran, Russia,
Venezuela, and North Korea have each turned to different forms of cryptocurrency as a method of skirting around harsh financial sanctions leveled
83
against them by the United States and United Nations. The second tranche
of users who employ cryptocurrencies as a method of sanctions evasion are
84
commercial businesses and individuals. There are two features which contribute to users’ capabilities in the realm of sanctions evasion, both of which
85
might be solved by international regulation.

1. Pseudo-Anonymity
86

First, cryptocurrencies have an inherently high degree of anonymity.
This is well illustrated by the inner workings of Bitcoin. Each Bitcoin user’s
87
public key is scrambled to produce a public Bitcoin address. The public
may see who sends and receives transactions, because both users’ Bitcoin
88
addresses are made public in the course of these transactions. The public
may also see the amount of cryptocurrency transferred within the transac-

81.
See, e.g., HM Treasury, Digital Currencies: Response to the Call for Information
11-12 (2015) [hereinafter HM Treasury Report]; Deane R. Konowicz, The New Game: Cryptocurrency Challenges US Economic Sanctions, (Feb. 8, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U.S. Navy War College) (on file with the Defense Technical Information Center).
82.
Jason Brett, Trend Continues for Countries Looking to Evade U.S. Sanctions Using
Crypto, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/01/29/trendcontinues-for-countries-looking-to-evade-us-sanctions-using-crypto/#4f20e5a159ff; Anthony
Cuthbertson, Sanction, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-national-cryptocurrency-us-sanctions-bitcoin-trumpa8512596.html.
83.
See Ian Munroe, Venezuela, Russia Aim to Dodge Sanctions with Cryptocurrency
but Experts Aren’t Buying It, CBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca
/news/world/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-russia-venezuela-sanctions-1.4477323.
84.
See, e.g., Thomas Erdbrink, How Bitcoin Could Help Iran Undermine U.S. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/world
/middleeast/bitcoin-iran-sanctions.html.
85.
See infra Part IV.
86.
HM Treasury, supra note 81, at 12; see also Monetarists Anonymous; Bitcoin,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2012).
87.
Felten, supra note 30.
88.
See Is Bitcoin Anonymous?, BITCOIN MAG. (2020), https://bitcoinmagazine.com
/guides/bitcoin-anonymous.
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89

tion. However, that is where the identification ends: The Bitcoin addresses
do not include any information that personally identifies the individuals on
90
either end of the transaction. This results in what the industry refers to as
91
“pseudo-anonymity.” In practice, this anonymity has permitted businesses
in sanctioned countries to exploit Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to
92
evade financial sanctions.

2. Third-Party Intermediaries
Second, there are limited third-party authorities with the capabilities to
93
freeze, cancel or reverse digital currency payments. Further, those that do
94
exist are unlikely to exercise their powers to monitor digital exchanges. Fi95
nancial intermediaries profit off of their users’ cryptocurrency transactions.
To halt any exchange is to disrupt the intermediaries’ flow of income. This is
underscored by the intermediaries’ customer agreements which absolve
96
them of liability for any manipulative market activities. In the context of
financial sanction evasions, this is problematic for two reasons. First, even if
an intermediary is cognizant of an illicit exchange of digital currency, the
incentives to halt the exchange are minimal. Second, financial intermediaries may be incentivized to cater to users located in sanctioned countries. In
97
part because of U.S. sanctions, Iran has become a hotspot for Bitcoin; intermediaries have capitalized on this trend by matching buyers in Iran to
98
sellers in countries around the world.

89.
Id.
90.
See Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH.
REV. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-transactionsarent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/.
91.
See id.
92.
Erdbrink, supra note 84.
93.
HM Treasury, supra note 81, at 12.
94.
Kelly Funderburk, Regulating Cryptocurrency, REGULATORY REV. (July 31, 2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/31/funderburk-regulating-cryptocurrency/.
95.
Id.
96.
Timothy Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets,
BROOKINGS UNIV. 21 (Mar. 2019).
97.
See Bradley Keoun, Bitcoin as a Safe Haven? US-Iran Tensions Rekindle Debate,
COINDESK (Jan. 6, 2020, 9:19 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-as-a-safe-haven-usiran-tensions-rekindle-debate.
98.
Billy Bambrough, Iran Sanctions: People Are Turning to Bitcoin to Get Money Out,
FORBES (May 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/05/10/iransanctions-people-are-turning-to-bitcoin-to-get-money-out/#2beb7e50613a.
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C. Curtailing the Evasion of Financial Sanctions through
Cryptocurrency: A Practical and Theoretical Analysis
1. The Doctrine of Clean Hands
As a matter of legal theory, curtailing the evasion of financial sanctions
through cryptocurrency may be justified through the concept of “clean
hands.” In this analysis, the doctrine of clean hands is interpreted through
both an ethical and legal lens; the moral doctrine informs the application of
its legal counterpart.
First, the ethical theory of clean hands implies that states have a moral
99
obligation to cease trading with bad actors within the international sphere.
Under this ethical doctrine, the objective of economic sanctions is to do
more than change the offending state’s behavior or punish the state for its
transgressions. Instead, the focus is turned inward. The aim of economic
100
sanctions is to avoid complicity with the targeted state’s unlawful actions.
The same analysis may be extended to the evasion of financial sanctions.
When bad actors evade sanctions, the international community assumes an
obligation to quash this bad behavior or otherwise risk complicity.
This analysis dovetails with the legal doctrine of clean hands in international law. The legal principle of clean hands states that an actor who has
violated equitable norms “may be deprived of the necessary locus standi in
judicio for complaining of corresponding illegalities on the part of other
101
States.” An evaluation follows as to how this compels an international
regulatory framework for cryptocurrency.
One manifestation of the clean hands doctrine within customary international law is the principle of nullus commodum capere de sua injuria pro102
pria (“no advantage may be gained from one’s wrong”). The wrong in this
instance is the failure to regulate cryptocurrency or regulation in a manner
that is wholly inadequate. This constitutes a wrong because the absence of
103
regulation is a catalyst for the evasion of international sanctions. As in-

99.
For an in-depth discussion of this philosophical argument, see Noam J. Zohar, Boycott, Crime, and Sin: Ethical and Talmudic Responses to Injustice Abroad, CAMBRIDGE UNIV.
PRESS 39 (2012).
100.
Id. at 46, 52.
101.
Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 39 (2013). Locus standi in judicio refers to “the right to bring an
action, to be heard in court, or to address the Court on a matter before it.” Locus Standi Law
and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL (2019).
102.
Ori Pomson & Yonatan Horowitz, Humanitarian Intervention and the Clean Hands
Doctrine in International Law, ISRAEL L. REV. 219, 231 (2015).
103.
An obligation exists under customary international law to enforce international
sanctions. States must apply all signed treaties in good faith, and to violate one’s obligation of
good faith is to violate customary international law. The requirement of good faith means that
a party may not avoid an obligation under an agreement by a literal interpretation of a clause.
See Draft Articles on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries,
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formed by the ethical theory of clean hands, failing to combat the evasion of
sanctions is a moral wrong.
All states that fail to combat the evasion of sanctions profit from this
wrong. The effective regulation of cryptocurrency is an expensive, bureau104
cratic, and time-consuming endeavor. Thus, states gain an advantage (by
freeing obligated state resources) from their wrong (declining to effectively
regulate cryptocurrencies in a manner that curtails the evasion of sanctions).
From this analytical exercise, it follows that states are violating the legal
clean hands doctrine. As such, states risk their judicial standing should they
wish to litigate an issue arising from the evasion of sanctions through cryptocurrency.

2. Just War Theory
The two conceptual analyses of “clean hands” obligations are underpinned by the assumption that economic sanctions are themselves legally
and ethically justified. A theoretical counterpoint to the clean hands arguments may therefore be raised by attacking the legality of economic sanc105
tions themselves. Commentators have leveled this critique through the
106
lens of just war theory, which justifies acts of aggression only under cer107
tain conditions. A core tenet of just war theory is the requirement of pro108
portionality. Legal theorists have derided economic sanctions as dispro109
portional and thereby in violation of the proportionality principle. If one
accepts this argument as true, then the theoretical justifications underpinning responses to the evasion of economic sanctions falls apart. Any response to evasions of sanctions is not justified if the sanctions themselves
were illegal from the outset.
This argument falls short upon examination of the methods by which international sanctions are implemented. When a multi-state body such as the
United Nations institutes economic sanctions against a state, it undergoes a

A/CONF. 39/11 Add. 2, 30-31 (1969) (comment on principle of pacta sunt servanda); see also
J. Curtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of
Nicaragua, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 190 (1986).
104.
See Regulation of Cryptocurrency: Switzerland, LIB. OF CONG. (July 24, 2020),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/switzerland.php.
105.
See, e.g., MARK R. AMSTUTZ, INTERNATIONAL ETHICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND
CASES IN GLOBAL POLITICS (4th ed. 2016); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Collective Enforcement
of International Norms Through Economic Sanctions, ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 7 (1999); Joy
Gordon, Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the “Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian
Dead”, CROSSCURRENTS 387 (1999).
106.
See Elizabeth Ellis, The Ethics of Economic Sanctions, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, The University of Edinburgh) (on file with The University of Edinburgh).
107.
James
T.
Johnson,
Just
War,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/just-war (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
108.
Ellis, supra note 106, at 75–76.
109.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 105, at 389.
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complex series of legal and diplomatic processes which culminate in a vote
110
taken by the UN Security Council. Fifteen states vote on the sanctions in
each instance, nine of which must vote in favor for any sanction to take ef111
fect. Adjustments to sanctions are then informed by monitoring groups,
smaller teams, and various panels that support the work of sanctions com112
mittees. Sanctions under the authority of the European Union are subject
113
to a similar process. These supranational bodies would be hard-pressed to
enact a more thorough process without risking outsized bureaucratic encumbrances before and during the implementation of the sanctions. In this
way, these international conglomerates satisfy the just war proportionality
114
requirement.

3. Practical Implications
Curtailing the evasion of financial sanctions through cryptocurrency is
imperative. First, to do without regulation allows unstable regimes to raise
money they would not have otherwise had access to. A prime example is
115
that of Kim Jong-un’s government in North Korea. North Korea is currently using revenues derived from cryptocurrency to bolster its nuclear
116
weapons program.

110.
UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them, U.N. NEWS
(May 4, 2016), https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/528382-un-sanctions-what-they-are-howthey-work-and-who-uses-them.
111.
Id.; U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 2.
112.
UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them, supra note
110.
113.
Adoption and Review Procedure for EU Sanctions, EUR. COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/adoption-review-procedure (last visited
Oct. 9, 2020).
114.
International bodies such as the European Union have similar vetting requirements
regarding the institution of sanctions and are at least equally cognizant of sanctions’ proportionality. See Sanctions: How and When the EU Adopts Restrictive Measures, EUR. COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). Of course,
sanctions may also be imposed through the unilateral force of a single state. The proportionality critique has more force in this second scenario. Conceding this, a strength of the international framework proposed in Section IV is that it depends on the multilateral cooperation of
states. Other states will feasibly be less willing to cooperate in investigations to enforce a
sanction by which they feel a state has unilaterally violated the just war proportionality requirement. Therefore, even though unilateral sanctions may be enforced under the framework
outlined in Section IV, it will require the cooperation of other states through which the proportionality of the sanctions in question may then be evaluated.
115.
Mike Orcutt, This is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com
/s/615324/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering.
116.
Id.
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Organizations like the United Nations and European Union have also
117
placed broad prohibitions on transactions with people and companies.
Sanctions are imposed as a last resort and are typically used to address only
118
the gravest international concerns. The United Nations lists curtailing the
efforts of extremist groups, ending “massive human rights violations,” and
119
halting illegal smuggling as examples of sanctions’ legitimate uses.
To allow the use of cryptocurrency to go unchecked is to seriously undermine the efficacy of financial sanctions. Perhaps the most alarming aspect is that the public is unaware of the scale of the problem. Due to the
pseudo-anonymity that many digital currencies afford their users, the public
is often blind to the number of sanctioned countries, businesses, groups, and
individuals who continuously bypass sanctions through cryptocurrency
120
transactions. The growing number of cryptocurrency users also contributes to the problem: the more accessible that cryptocurrency becomes
throughout the world, the greater the access that those evading sanctions
121
have to global financial markets. Without the imposition of an internation122
al regulatory framework, these problems will only continue to propagate.

IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
CRYPTOCURRENCY
A formal international regulatory mechanism for cryptocurrencies
would have numerous benefits, foremost among them limiting the evasion
of international sanctions. An international regulatory mechanism would also promote predictability in the regulation of cryptocurrencies. This would
in turn entice institutional investors to build out the field of crypto users and

117.
Anahita Thoms, Cryptocurrencies and Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/03/09/2199186/guest-post-cryptocurrencies-and-sanctions;
United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, U.N. S.C. (Oct. 31, 2020)
https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=
htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl.
118.
UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them, supra note
110.
119.
Id.
120.
See generally Andrew Bloom, Enforcing Sanctions in the Age of Cryptocurrency,
GBA GLOB. (June 27, 2019), https://www.gbaglobal.org/enforcing-sanctions-in-the-age-ofcryptocurrency.
121.
Ana Alexandre, FDD Assesses Risks of Crypto Use by Countries Under US Sanctions, COINTELEGRAPH (July 11, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/fdd-assesses-risks-ofcrypto-use-by-countries-under-us-sanctions.
122.
Cf. YAYA J. FANUSIE & TREVOR LOGAN, CRYPTO ROGUES: U.S. STATE
ADVERSARIES SEEKING BLOCKCHAIN SANCTIONS RESISTANCE (2019), https://www.fdd.org
/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/fdd-report-crypto-rogues.pdf (showcasing the varying arenas of
difficulty among national crypto regulatory regimes in Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and China).
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encourage stability in an otherwise volatile marketplace. Section IV.A describes the features required of an international regulatory framework for
cryptocurrency. Section IV.B describes why an oft-proposed regulatory solution—the application of the IMF, WTO and CISG to cryptocurrencies—is
an inadequate answer for an international regulatory framework. Section
IV.C proposes a solution based on a multilateral treaty framework. This
framework draws upon existing and effective regulatory mechanisms.

A. Requirements of an International Regulatory Framework
The introduction of an international regulatory framework for crypto124
currency is hardly a novel idea. Commentators have debated its merits
125
since the arrival of cryptocurrency but rarely agree on an ideal form, sub126
127
stance, or method of implementation. This note adds to the existing
body of literature by focusing on three perceived problems of the nation-bynation framework, each of which contributes to the evasion of international
financial sanctions through cryptocurrency. The first deficiency stems from
128
the current levels of pseudo-anonymity in cryptocurrency transactions.
The second problem is the patchwork framework which restricts coordina123.
See generally Cumming et al., supra note 73, at 132 (“Recognizing the inability of
enforcement within existing regulatory frameworks, we discuss the importance of regulation
of the crypto asset class . . . in the establishment of an ecosystem that integrates investor protection and investments”); Kelly, supra note 76.
124.
Compare Howden, supra note 51, at 745–56 (arguing that regulatory bodies must
undertake the regulation of all cryptocurrencies), with Nabilou, supra note 51, at 272–90 (arguing that cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin cannot be regulated in a centralized fashion because of their decentralized structure, and that regulation must occur at their code or protocol
layer).
125.
Compare Howden, supra note 51, at 746 (“Differing regulations across nations
concerning cryptos are not necessarily problematic, and some countries may have valid reasons for asserting more stringent regulations. However, an international forum must be provided so countries can work together in order to avoid the possible dangers that may face less
economically developed nations and their interaction with the growing use and popularity of
cryptos.”), with Nabilou, supra note 51, at 275 (arguing for “decentralized indirect regulation”).
126.
The Bank for International Settlements’ focuses regarding key regulatory issues
(citing “moral suasion,” regulation of intermediaries, and the “interpretation of existing regulations,” among other points) differs radically from those of the European Central Bank (citing
“co-ordinated governmental efforts from national authorities” as key to any regulatory approach). ROSARIO GIRASA, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES & BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 199–201 (2018).
127.
Compare Irina Cvetkova, Cryptocurrencies Legal Regulation, 5 BRICS L.J. 128,
152 (2018) (arguing that only progressive jurisdictional and state regulation of cryptocurrency
activity will allow for the implementation of legitimate and safe cryptocurrency relations),
with Andres Guadamuz & Chris Marsden, Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory Responses to
Cryptocurrencies, FIRST MONDAY (2015), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/6198/5163 (arguing for five different proposals that might be effective in regulating cryptocurrency, none of
which rely uniformly on state regulation).
128.
See supra Section III.B.
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tion across nations and allows for unpredictable results across jurisdic129
tions. The patchwork framework also permits offending actors to slip
through the cracks and raises the spectre of double jeopardy when perpetra130
tors are identified and punished. The third and final deficiency is the absence of trustworthy third-party authorities with the power to examine the
131
legitimacy of cryptocurrency transactions. These three problems may be
summarized respectively as anonymity, coordination, and oversight.

1. Adjustments on the Spectrum of Pseudo-Anonymity
With these considerations in mind, a successful international regulatory
framework of cryptocurrency should have two characteristics. First, it
should provide governments with the identities of their nations’ cryptocur132
rency users. This preserves a level of “pseudo-anonymity” whilst permit133
ting the implementation of regulatory functions: users’ identities will remain anonymous to all but certain governmental actors. This is important as
a frequent concern raised in response to the prospect of an international reg134
ulatory regime is the erasure of cryptocurrency users’ anonymity.
Regulations exposing aspects of a user’s identity should be viewed as a
shift on the spectrum of anonymity instead of an obliteration of user anonymity altogether. The recently implemented Know Your Customer
(“KYC”) laws in the European Union demonstrates one way this shift might

129.
See supra Section III.A.
130.
Id.
131.
See supra Section III.B.
132.
It’s worthwhile to acknowledge that should this solution be implemented in a cashless society, this would result in a society without entirely anonymous payments, even for benign actors. The focus of this note, however, is the more realistic and immediate solution: the
regulation of cryptocurrency in a world that is dependent on traditional payment forms with
cryptocurrency being used as an alternative alongside. This has the advantage of taking into
account the current payments landscape. As of publication, no country in the world is entirely
dependent upon cryptocurrency payments, nor meaningfully close to being so. See Perez, supra note 34. (detailing the countries that are close to becoming cashless societies—this is
largely facilitated by the widespread use of credit and debit cards alongside the use of cryptocurrency. Notably, no country is close to becoming entirely dependent upon cryptocurrencies.).
133.
Id.
134.
Jerry Brito, China intends to launch a national digital currency that will let the
government easily surveil spending. Following in their footsteps would be a mistake, COIN
CENTER (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.coincenter.org/china-intends-to-launch-a-nationaldigital-currency-that-will-let-the-government-easily-surveil-spending-following-in-theirfootsteps-would-be-a-mistake/ (“Any . . . American-led effort [to regulate cryptocurrencies]
must . . . mak[e] anonymity and censorship-resistance core network features.”); Rakesh Sharma, What Does Government Regulation Mean for Privacy-Focused Cryptocurrencies?,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/news/what-does-increasedgovernment-regulation-mean-privacyfocused-coins (quoting the CEO of Digital Dash, an open
source alternative cryptocurrency: “Privacy is important for many practical reasons including
user safety, so we believe it is an important aspect to incorporate into our solutions.”).
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135

be accomplished. The cornerstone of KYC regulations is the requirement
that European financial institutions duly identify and verify their clients’
136
identities. This law has impacted cryptocurrency exchanges throughout
Europe, each of whom are now required to peel back layers of anonymity to
137
uncover their users’ identities. The KYC laws do not unveil crypto users’
138
identities to the public at large. Rather, users’ identities are mandatorily
disclosed to a select sphere of institutional actors as identified in the KYC
139
regulations. This system remains encumbered by several of the deficiencies identified by this note: untrustworthy third-party intermediaries still act
140
as gatekeepers to sensitive data and the risk remains of double jeopardy
141
violations between countries within and outside the European Union.
However, the KYC laws do illustrate that cryptocurrency regulations need
not strip away users’ pseudo-anonymity altogether. Regulatory solutions can
142
exist on the spectrum between complete anonymity and none at all.

2. International Coordination
Second, the framework should be organized in a way that encourages
coordination between states while remaining flexible enough to allow for
individual state implementation and national oversight. This tenet borrows
from organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization
143
(“ICAO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations. ICAO develops
recommended aviation practices followed by signatories of the Convention
144
on Civil Aviation (the “Chicago Convention”). One such practice is the

135.
For an extensive discussion on Know Your Customer laws, see The Impact of Rising
KYC & AML Regulations in Europe, KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER, https://knowyourcustomer.com
/impact-rising-kyc-aml-regulations-europe (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
136.
FEDOR POSKRIAKOV, MARIA CHIRIAEVA, & CHRISTOPHE CAVIN, Cryptocurrency
Compliance and Risks: A European KYC/AML Perspective, in BLOCKCHAIN &
CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION (Josias N. Dewey ed., 2nd ed. 2020), https://www.global
legalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/11-cryptocurrency-co
mpliance-and-risks-a-european-kyc-aml-perspective.
137.
See generally Craig Adeyanju, What Crypto Exchanges Do to Comply with KYC,
AML and CFT Regulations, COINTELEGRAPH (May 17, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com
/news/what-crypto-exchanges-do-to-comply-with-kyc-aml-and-cft-regulations; Darren Kleine,
Crypto Regulation is Coming to Europe: Are Exchanges Ready for New Rules?,
COINTELEGRAPH (Dec. 18, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-regulation-iscoming-to-europe-are-exchanges-ready-for-new-rules.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
See supra Section III.B.
141.
See supra Section III.A.
142.
See infra Section IV.C.
143.
See Convention on International Civil Aviation—Doc 7300, ICAO,
https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
144.
See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 46.
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145

Traveller Identification Programme (“TRIP”). The objective of TRIP is for
all U.N. Member States to have the ability to “uniquely identify individu146
als.” To facilitate the TRIP objective, the ICAO issues recommendations
that help nations develop repositories to hold credible evidence of identifica147
tion. Additionally, the ICAO facilitates the creation of globally interoper148
able protocols which link passports to their holders. The program outlined
149
in TRIP affords nations autonomy and flexibility in meeting these goals.
Crucially, the TRIP program simultaneously maintains a global network in
which passports—and thereby individuals—can be identified at any interna150
tional juncture.
The multilateral nature of ICAO allows for flexibility and the continu151
ous development of travel protocols. This is also a desirable asset for the
regulation of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrencies are a fast-developing mar152
153
ket which national governments do not yet fully understand. The ability
to review and revise the international regulatory structure is paramount to
leave room for improvements and ensure that any regulatory framework
154
does not become stale.
145.
Traveller Identification Programme, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL
/TRIP/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
For example, TRIP permits nations flexibility in the identifying information held in
each national passport database. Some nations such as Argentina maintain biometric data accessible by a wide variety of Argentinian governmental agencies; others, such as Canada, are
in the process of eliminating the development of centralized databases containing biometric
information. Biometric Data Retention for Passport Applicants and Holders, L. LIBR. CONG.
(Mar. 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/biometric-data-retention/biometric-passport-dataretention.pdf [hereinafter Biometric Data Retention]. TRIP also provides recommendations for
Machine Readable Travel Documents (“MRTD” or passports) which allows for flexibility in
th
their form and substance. See Machine Readable Travel Documents (Doc 9303), ICAO (7 ed.
2015), https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p3_cons_en.pdf.
150.
Traveller Identification Programme, supra note 145.
151.
For example, ICAO has recently begun to engage with the United Nations’ sustainable development goals (“SDGs”) and has linked its strategic objectives to these goals. It continuously monitors the effects of these goals and develops its framework as appropriate. Aviation Development, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/about-icao/aviation-development/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020); ICAO and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/about-icao/aviation-development/pages/sdg.aspx (last
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
152.
Over 2000 cryptocurrencies are currently available for purchase and this number is
growing. See Reiff, supra note 12.
153.
The mechanisms underlying cryptocurrencies are frequently posited to be shrouded
in an aura of mystery and branded as “hard, even [for] smart people.” See Michael Arrington,
It Will Take Years for Smart People to Understand Cryptocurrencies, NAKAMOTO
(Jan. 3, 2020), https://nakamoto.com/it-will-take-years-for-smart-people-to-understandcryptocurrencies.
154.
Massad, supra note 96, at 42.
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B. Past Proposals for the International Regulation of Cryptocurrency
One proposal that frequently surfaces within the literature on crypto
regulation repurposes provisions within current international regulatory bod155
ies to police digital assets. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the
156
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and the Convention on the Interna157
tional Sale of Goods (“CISG”) have each been cited as different regulatory possibilities to control for the use and abuse of cryptocurrencies. These
organizations assert control by classifying cryptocurrencies in ways that
force conformity with the international organizations’ slates of regulatory
measures.
These proposals have the advantage of working within international
158
159
160
systems that already exist. The WTO, IMF, and CISG each have 164,
189, and 84 participating countries, respectively. Moreover, provisions exist
within each organization or regime that could conceivably be applicable to
cryptocurrencies. For example, cryptocurrencies could arguably constitute a
161
sale of a good under the CISG. If classified as such, the exchange of cryptocurrencies would be regulated in every contract of sale made under the
162
CISG. This would have implications for issues such as the breach of
cross-border cryptocurrency contracts, the mitigation of damages in failed
transactions, and responsibility for the substitution of subpar goods pur163
chased with crypto coins. Indeed, one commentator dubbed the applicabil-

155.
Howden, supra note 51, at 780.
156.
Wolfie Zhao, IMF Chief Lagarde: Global Cryptocurrency Regulation is ‘Inevitable,’ COINDESK (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/imf-chief-lagarde-globalcryptocurrency-regulation-is-inevitable.
157.
Sebastian Omlor, The CISG and Libra: A Monetary Revolution for International
Commercial Transactions?, STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 83, 94 (2020).
158.
WTO: Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. [“WTO”],
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
159.
List of Members, INT’L MONETARY FUND [“IMF”] (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm.
160.
CISG:
Table
of
Contracting
States,
CISG
(Jan.
8,
2016),
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html.
161.
Although the convention does not explicitly define “goods,”neither is the definition
derived from domestic law. Instead, the definition of what constitutes a good is “subject to the
autonomous interpretation of the CISG in its international character.” See Omlor, supra note
157, at 87. See also COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS (CISG) Art. 1 para. 16 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Peter Schlechtriem eds., 2nd ed.
2005); FRANCO FERRARI & MARCO TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW—CISG IN A
NUTSHELL 95 (1st ed. 2014).
162.
Koji Takahashi, Applicability of CISG, BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTOCURRENCY, CRYPTOASSET & L. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://cryptocurrencylaw.blogspot.com/2015/11/applicability-ofcisg.html.
163.
Albert H. Krtizer, General Principles of the CISG, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF INT’L
COM. L. (Sept. 7, 1999), https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/principles7.html.
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ity of the CISG to cryptocurrencies as nothing short of a “monetary revolu164
tion.”
Alternatively, the argument that regulation should take place under the
WTO suggests that cryptocurrencies should be classified as a good that may
165
be traded between nations. If classified as such, cryptocurrencies would
166
become subject to various restrictive trading provisions of the WTO. One
such provision is Most-Favored-Nation clause: With certain exceptions, this
167
clause requires that all nations treat each other equally in trade. Under this
interpretation, a country could choose to regulate digital assets by banning
168
cryptocurrency “imports” into their domestic market entirely.
The WTO’s classification of cryptocurrency as a good could also lead to
169
IMF oversight. To classify cryptocurrency as a good would catalyze the
IMF’s jurisdiction over exchange controls relating to the payment and trans170
fer of cryptocurrencies. This would also give the IMF discretion over
cryptocurrency exchange rate restrictions, although how this might work in
171
practice is anyone’s guess.
172
Each of these approaches has distinct benefits. However, the various
weaknesses apply across the board. The first fundamental weakness of the
aforementioned approaches is that each regulatory mechanism suffers from
a structural disadvantage. The IMF, WTO and CISG each require the classi173
fication of cryptocurrency as a good. The merits of this classification have
174
been oft-debated, but the fact remains that cryptocurrency is unlike any
commodity, service or currency that international organizations regulate. In
each instance, this translates into a structural weakness. To illustrate: the

164.
Omlor, supra note 157, at 83.
165.
Howden, supra note 51, at 783.
166.
Id. at 784.
167.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A—11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
168.
Howden, supra note 51, at 784; Omlor, supra note 157.
169.
Id.
170.
Deborah Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles
of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 561, 563 (2002).
171.
Exchange restrictions are typically tied to state-centric factors such as private and
public debt, trade, and monetary reserves. Howden, supra note 51, at 771. Because cryptocurrencies are not tied to a single state it is unclear how the IMF might enforce or restrict an exchange rate on digital assets.
172.
See, e.g., Howden, supra note 51, at 770—93.
173.
Id. at 783; Omlor, supra note 157, at 87—88.
174.
See, e.g., Jake Ryan, Crypto Classification: Security vs. Commodity, HACKER
NOON (Aug. 2, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/crypto-classification-security-vs-commoditydecf2d78c4a1; see also Cryptocurrency: The Top Things You Need to Know, BDO (Jan. 2019),
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/9a49abf0-c90a-453c-81efe50f758e136a/attachment.aspx?Cryptocurrency-The-Top-Things-You-Need-To-Know-(1).pdf.
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CISG is not equipped for the extreme volatility of cryptocurrencies. The
IMF would have immense difficulty enforcing an exchange rate on digital
176
assets untethered to any state. The WTO would need to devise a way to
determine the cryptocurrency’s country of origin to make for effective regulation (a standard that is already unclear without the added layer of crypto177
currency). No doubt there are short-term fixes to each of these prob178
lems, but they amount to mere band-aids on enormous structural deficits
that cannot be solved by mere language tweaks or newly applied methods of
textual interpretation.
The second fundamental weakness of using pre-existing conventions to
regulate cryptocurrencies is that the conventions’ terms do not address the
heart of the problem. Each of these organizations was designed to eliminate
specific regulatory dilemmas that existed well before the development of
179
cryptocurrency.
Challenges unique to digital currencies—pseudo180
181
anonymity, untrustworthy third-party intermediaries, volatility in their
182
worth —are not included within these conventions and will remain unaddressed should the international community resort to regulation through
any of these pre-existing organizations.

C. International Regulation: A New, Multilateral Treaty
The creation of a new multilateral treaty is the most realistic way to implement international regulatory standards on the use of cryptocurrency. It is
also the most effective method of preventing the evasion of financial sanc-

175.
Miklós Király, The Vienna Convention on International Sales of Goods and the
Bitcoin, U.S.—CHINA L. REV. 182 (2019) (“The crux [of the problem] is that the CISG refers . . . to the price charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract, while the dramatic
change in Bitcoin’s value might have happened just after it.”).
176.
Exchange restrictions imposed by the IMF are typically tied to state-centric factors
such as private and public debt, trade, and monetary reserves. See Howden, supra note 51, at
771.
177.
Id. at 788.
178.
For example, Howden proposes a solution to the WTO “place of origin” dilemma:
“A simple measure to determine a crypto’s country of origin would be to identify the origin
country as that country from which the crypto was last sent.” Id.
179.
Indeed, the WTO was designed with the goal of liberalizing trade, an objective that
some might characterize as somewhat antithetical to the goals of regulation. See id. at 781.
The CISG was designed to unify commercial law and alleviate obstacles to international trade.
Harry M. Flechtner, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2009), https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ccisg/ccisg.html.
The IMF served “to overcome the collective action problem of allowing individual countries
to enact self-interested economic policies without jeopardizing the global economy.” Nicholas
A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach of the IMF, 14
CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 390–91 (2013).
180.
See supra Section III.B.
181.
See id.
182.
See supra Section III.A.
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183

tions through the use of digital currencies. This is because a new multilateral treaty can be structured to address challenges unique to the regulation
184
of cryptocurrency from the outset.
The following proposal goes beyond standard legal justifications for a
multilateral mechanism. It drills down into the substantive mechanisms that
an effective treaty must include. The levels of specificity to this end are perhaps uncommon in a typical legal analysis. At first, this might even seem
beyond the scope of a legal proposal. However, this analysis is essential to
explain why a new, multilateral treaty is required. The current structures in
place could not begin to grapple with the complex underlying issues which
are so crucial to the regulation of cryptocurrency. As such, the substantive
components of the proposed treaty undergird the very reason why a new
multilateral treaty is necessary.

1. Public Key Cryptography
The proposed multilateral framework should consist of three equally
important dimensions. The first dimension implicates the technology which
185
underlies all cryptocurrencies: public key cryptography. Public key cryp186
tography is the crux of cryptocurrency users’ pseudo-anonymity. It is also
a fundamental way in which cryptocurrencies may themselves be regulat187
ed. The identification of cryptocurrency users is important because it is
the gateway to additional, future regulation. States cannot regulate users
188
who cannot be identified. Deanonymizing users also has intrinsic value: If
countries can identify the users conducting cryptocurrency transactions, they
will be better able to identify those users, governments, or agents that defy
international financial sanctions.
To accomplish these objectives, the new international regulatory framework should require the establishment of national databases of public keys
linked to personal identifying information. If public keys are identified within a central national system, each cryptocurrency transaction may be traced

183.
See supra Section III.C.
184.
This is in contrast to the WTO, CISG, and IMF which were all created for varied
and distinguishable challenges that cryptocurrency either does not face or that are tangential to
the real issues at hand. See Király, supra note 175.
185.
Public and Private Keys, supra note 26.
186.
Id.
187.
See, e.g., Dan Ryan, FinCEN: Know Your Customer Requirements, HARVARD L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 7, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07
/fincen-know-your-customer-requirements (outlining the Know Your Customer requirements,
created to “help financial institutions avoid illicit transactions”).
188.
See Elizabeth Rosenberg & Neil Bhatiya, Busting North Korea’s Sanctions Evasion,
CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary
/busting-north-koreas-sanctions-evasion (documenting strategies to undercut North Korean
financing of proliferation, the authors recommend a “culture of collaboration to identify and
halt the money trail for the nuclear threats emanating from North Korea” [emphasis added]).
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189

to its source by that nation’s government. Similar to KYC regulations, this
framework decreases anonymity of cryptocurrency users by revealing their
190
identities to a central database. However, a level of pseudo-anonymity
does remain intact: The identities of cryptocurrency users would be anonymous to all non-governmental users without access to this central database.
Simply put, a central database of public keys is similar to a central database
of bank account numbers, yet without the problematic risks: Unlike bank
191
192
account numbers, public keys are intended to be made public. There is
no risk of fraud or unauthorized withdrawals from a user’s digital wallet as a
bad actor cannot access these funds without the user’s corresponding private
193
key.
This framework draws upon the ICAO structure for the storage of pass194
port information. Under ICAO, each participating country maintains a national database of passport numbers and corresponding identifying infor195
196
mation.
Similar to ICAO’s passport database requirements,
the
cryptocurrency treaty should require states to maintain certain standards of
public key identification while allowing for flexibility regarding methods of
implementation. This eliminates a problem that frequently vexes multilateral
197
treaties: unwieldy rules that large groups of states can rarely agree upon.

2. International Public Key Directory
Public key identification within a national database is helpful for discrete states. However, by itself it does little to aid in international regulation.
To be fully effective, the multilateral framework must also include a mechanism that enables cross-border information-sharing. Again, ICAO provides a

189.
See Surveillance Defense, supra note 29.
190.
See supra Section IV.A.
191.
See What Can Someone Do With Your Bank Account Number?, BANKS (Oct. 16,
2018), https://banks.org/what-can-someone-do-with-your-bank-account-number.
192.
See Jake Frankenfield, Public Key, INVESTOPEDIA (July 30, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/public-key.asp.
193.
Id.
194.
See Traveller Identification Programme, supra note 145.
195.
Some states such as Argentina, Mexico, and the United States have opted to use
biometric identification such as fingerprints and photographs to identify travelers, while countries such as Japan use databases that store application forms for passports without the biometric data of all passport applicants. See, e.g., Biometric Data Retention, supra note 149.
196.
Narjess Abdennebi, ICAO Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Strategy,
ICAO SKY TALKS WORKSHOPS 18—19 (2016), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/workshops
/Documents/A39%20Workshops%20-%20TRIP%20Strategy.pdf.
197.
See Bilateral or Multilateral: Which Trade Partnerships Work Best?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 27, 2017), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article
/bilateral-multilateral-trade-partnerships-work-best.
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198

useful blueprint. ICAO maintains a Public Key Directory (“PKD”) which
199
functions as a central repository of cryptographic public keys. This allows
for the exchange of information required to authenticate the digital signa200
tures of ePassports. Notably, the ICAO PKD does not contain any person201
al information about the passport holder. This public key information is
202
available to all participating countries.
Similarly, a cryptocurrency PKD should be established which shares the
national origin of each public key without further identifying data. This
would allow states to crack down on the evasion of international sanctions
without compromising the personal information of cryptocurrency users.
Further, should states wish to open an investigation, the PKD would act as a
springboard from which further negotiations could ensue between countries.
ICAO acts as a collaborative fulcrum around which states work to reach
203
their objectives in civil aviation and international security; the cryptocurrency treaty would do the same to prevent digital currency transactions that
evade financial sanctions.
An alternative proposition to a multilateral PKD is the enactment of bi204
lateral treaties which enable the exchange of public key information.
However, the downsides of this proposal are numerous. Not only would this
205
mechanism prove exponentially more expensive, but the coordination ef206
forts would prove inordinately cumbersome. To illustrate, if eight states
wished to conduct exchanges of public key information using bilateral trea-

198.
For a detailed explanation on the technical underbelly of the ICAO PKD, see
MARKUS HARTMANN, STEPHAN KÖRTING, & OLGA KÄTHLER, A PRIMER ON THE ICAO
PUBLIC KEY DIRECTORY (2009), http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/creo_files/upload
/client_files/hjp_pkd_promotion-paper_v1_5_20090520.pdf.
199.
Public Key Directory, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages
/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
200.
Id.; Christiane DerMarkar, ICAO Public Key Directory – State of Progress, ICAO 2
(2019),
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/TRIP-Symposium-2019/PublishingImages/Pages
/Presentations/ICAO%20Public%20Key%20Directory(PKD)-State%20of%20Progress.pdf.
201.
The public key information only serves to confirm that “the ePassport has been issued by a bona fide authority and that it has not been tampered with. ePassports: Digital Signatures and the Public Key Directory, GOV’T CAN. (May 13, 2014), https://www.canada.ca
/en/news/archive/2014/05/epassports-digital-signatures-public-key-directory.html.
202.
Id. See also ICAO PKD Participants, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/Security
/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-PKDParticipants.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
203.
Cooperation Delivers Enhanced ICAO Compliance and Sustainable Aviation Development, ICAO (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/Cooperationdelivers-enhanced-ICAO-compliance-and-sustainable-aviation-development.aspx.
204.
See Roman Vanek, ICAO Public Key Directory, KEESING PLATFORM (June 1,
2013), https://platform.keesingtechnologies.com/icao-public-key-directory.
205.
Id.
206.
Christine DerMarkar, ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD), ICAO SKY TALKS
WORKSHOPS 6 (2016), https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/workshops/Documents/A39%20
Workshop%20-%20PKD.pdf.
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ties, this would require fifty-six information exchanges. Under the PKD,
only two exchanges of information are required—one from each country to
208
the central repository. If 191 states wished to conduct exchanges of infor209
mation, 36,290 bilateral exchanges of information would be necessary.
210
Under the PKD, the number of exchanges remains at two. A multilateral
treaty establishing a PKD is an elegant solution that avoids encumbering the
regulation of cryptocurrencies with bureaucratic red tape.

3. Prosecution Guidelines & Foreign Fine Credits
The third aspect of the proposed multilateral cryptocurrency treaty is
211
the inclusion of prosecution guidelines and the establishment of a mecha212
nism permitting foreign fine credits. This will further cement the norm of
international cooperation between states—both in investigations and prosecutions—and will leave oversight in the hands of governmental actors in213
stead of self-interested third-party intermediaries.
The inclusion of a commitment to prosecution guidelines within the
multilateral treaty is an important step toward preventing instances of dou214
ble jeopardy. The evasion of financial sanctions is a cross-border endeavor, and the use of cryptocurrencies to do so has the potential to implicate
215
countless jurisdictions. To avoid placing individuals and businesses in
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
See, e.g., Guidelines for Deciding ‘Which Jurisdiction Should Prosecute?,’
EUROJUST
(2016),
https://www.anti-corruption.com/files/2018/08/30/2016_jurisdictionguidelines_en.pdf [hereinafter Eurojust Guidelines].
212.
Foreign fine credits are a tool that government enforcers typically use to prevent
double jeopardy issues in multinational settlements. They are repurposed here to provide relief
not only for multinational corporations, but individuals and small businesses that may also
find themselves subject to violations of double jeopardy. See Megan Zwiebel, Is the Pie Getting Bigger? Double Jeopardy in the Age of International Cooperation, ANTI-CORRUPTION
REP. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.anti-corruption.com/2619506/is-the-pie-getting-biggerdouble-jeopardy-in-the-age-of-international-cooperation.thtml.
213.
See supra Section III.B.
214.
Double jeopardy (or non bis in idem) is defined as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or
sentenced twice for substantially the same offense.” Double Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
215.
The technology underlying the use of cryptocurrency and blockchain allows for the
possibility of transactions touching computer servers (“nodes”) all over the world before their
completion. Under the legal principle of jurisdiction loci, this allows any number of nations to
assert jurisdiction over an illicit transaction should it touch one of their computer servers—the
physical territory that an entity’s authority covers—in passing. See Spatial Jurisdiction,
th
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11 ed. 2019); Jaak Poldma, Dragged to the U.S. Courts (Part 1):
Jurisdiction & the Location of Blockchain Nodes, ORRICK (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://blogs.orrick.com/blockchain/dragged-to-the-u-s-courts-part-1-jurisdiction-and-thelocation-of-blockchain-nodes.
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double jeopardy for the same alleged crimes, prosecution guidelines should
be used to ensure a just outcome. The Eurojust guidelines are an excellent
216
starting point. These guidelines place an emphasis on factors that might be
considered in a multi-jurisdictional case, including the protection of witnesses; the costs and resources which will be allocated to the investigation;
217
and the location of suspects.
In determining jurisdiction over the evasion of financial sanctions, some
factors may prove more helpful than others. Territoriality is one such fac218
tor. Under the Eurojust guidelines, a presumption is made that the prosecution will take place in the jurisdiction in which the majority of the crimi219
nal action occurred. As applied to the evasion of financial sanctions, if a
North Korean actor buys goods from a Japanese vendor using cryptocurrency, Japan has presumptive jurisdiction. This should remain the case even if
the transaction was communicated across hundreds of different servers the
world over; the most important aspect of the crime—the unlawful purchase
220
of goods—took place in Japan.
A second mechanism to prevent violations of double jeopardy is the in221
stitution of foreign fine credits. Foreign fine credits are a method used in
222
contemporaneous, multi-jurisdictional investigations. To the extent that
disgorgement or restitution is imposed during the course of one nation’s investigations, another would give “dollar-for-dollar credit” for fines in con223
nection with related actions. This has the effect of reducing duplicative
224
payments, or “piling on.” In the cryptocurrency treaty, this should be incorporated as a failsafe mechanism should the prosecution guidelines fail to
prevent multiple investigations for the same criminal action. Foreign fine
credits ensure that if multiple jurisdictions prosecute a single actor, that ac225
tor’s cooperation with and payment to all authorities is credited.

216.
See Eurojust Guidelines, supra note 211.
217.
Zwiebel, supra note 212.
218.
See Eurojust Guidelines, supra note 211, at 3.
219.
See id.
220.
See Eurojust Guidelines, supra note 210, at 3. See also Poldma, supra note 215.
The territoriality factor would also work in Japan’s favor in this instance as the location of one
of the parties under investigation is physically within Japanese territory.
221.
See Zwiebel, supra note 212.
222.
See Nathaniel Edmonds, Tara K. Giunta, Michael L. Spafford, & Daren F.
Stanaway, A New Enforcement Agency Joins the World of International Corruption Enforcement, PAUL HASTINGS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items
/details/?id=9955a96c-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded#_edn30.
223.
See James M. McDonald, Dir. of Enf’t, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
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In sum, the dual mechanisms proposed within the multilateral treaty
prioritize cross-border cooperation and altering the levels of pseudo226
anonymity to which cryptocurrency users are entitled. The framework will
require international buy-in and no doubt will take both time and trial-anderror to implement. However, a new multilateral framework remains the best
option for the regulation of cryptocurrency. Digital currencies are unlike any
technology currently regulated by the international system. To rely on options such as the WTO, CISG or IMF to provide effective regulatory mechanisms is tantamount to fitting a circle into a square. A new regulatory regime
may be tailored from its beginning to the unique properties of cryptocurrencies that allow for the evasion of international sanctions. With this goal in
mind from the outset, an effective framework might be built which allows
the world to use and benefit from cryptocurrencies to their full extent.

V. CONCLUSION
227

Cryptocurrencies began as a niche technology in 2009. A mere decade
later, cryptocurrencies are firmly entrenched within our global financial sys228
tem. Their benefits are numerous. It is hard to overstate the impact that
229
cryptocurrencies may have on emerging economies. Transactions using
cryptocurrency can prove easier and faster than those conducted through
230
231
banks, and transaction fees are usually nonexistent. The risk of identity
theft is much lower than when using traditional lines of payment such as

226.
This proposal necessarily entails more power in government’s agencies hands in
viewing the content of individuals’ transactions. For reasons explained within this note, however, the system would still be sufficiently airtight. Further guidelines would also be necessary
which lay out how and which agencies have the ability to use and access this data. This system
is warranted for the reasons explained within this note.
227.
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credit cards. Finally, cryptocurrencies are the great equalizer: If you have
233
access to the internet, you have access to cryptocurrency.
Along with cryptocurrencies’ benefits, however, comes a host of issues.
Many stem from the pseudo-anonymity afforded to users and the dearth of
234
international regulatory cooperation. Without an international regulatory
framework, sanctioned actors may conduct international transactions with
235
impunity. Functionally, this permits terrorists, unstable governmental regimes, and extremist groups access to funds from which they would other236
wise be deprived. This is untenable in a global financial system growing at
237
an exponential pace.
An international regulatory framework for cryptocurrency is therefore
vital. The only viable framework is through the enactment of a new, multilateral treaty with distinct features applicable only to cryptocurrencies. The
dual components of an international public key directory and mechanisms
which underscore international cooperation are essential to preventing the
evasion of financial sanctions. Moreover, a new multilateral treaty can provide a gateway to future regulatory efforts that address different aspects of
cryptocurrency regulation. Preventing financial sanctions solves only a
small component of the challenges that cryptocurrencies present. Nonetheless, the solution presented in this note is a crucial step in the right direction.
Perhaps most importantly, it may provide a blueprint for future regulations
yet to come.
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